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Der Autor beschreibt auf anhand statistischer Zugänge die Gewaltentwicklung in 
Südafrika von den 70er Jahren bis heute: Unter dem Apartheid-Regime äußerte sich 
Gewalt als vertikale bzw. strukturelle gegenüber den Bürgern, dehnte sich zuneh-
mend jedoch auch horizontal - innerhalb der Kommunen - aus und erreichte ihren 
Höhepunkt in den 90er Jahren zur Zeit der Demokratiebewegung. Gründe für diese 
paradox anmutende Entwicklung sieht der Autor u.a. in der durch das Apartheid-
Regime verursachten sozialen Ungleichheit, Deprivation und Marginalisierung brei-
ter Bevölkerungsgruppen, der Legitimierung der vom Staat ausgehenden strukturel-
len Gewalt, der Gewalt seitens der Polizei bis hin zur Folter, sowie der meist 
ausbleibenden gerichtlichen Verurteilung der Täter und und dem unzureichenden 
Opferschutz. Die meisten politischen Gruppierungen haben aus diesen Gründen bis 
in die 90er Jahre Gewalt zum Selbstschutz und zur Selbstjustiz befürwortet, da das 
die einzige Möglichkeit der Verteidigung und des Umgangs mit den gesellschaftlichen 
und politischen Realitäten sei.  Die Parteien greifen das Thema Gewalt aktuell immer 
wieder auf, schüren vorhandene Ängste und instrumentalisieren das Problem für 
Wahlkampfzwecke. Erforderlich ist hingegen eine differenzierte Analyse der 
Ursachen und Risikofaktoren, um mit Hilfe von Interventions- und 
Präventionsprogrammen gezielt in die Gewaltspirale eingreifen zu können. Die 
Regierung sollte bereit sein, auf demokratischer, sozioökonomischer und juristischer 
Ebene langfristig in eine Menschenrechtskultur zu investieren und Hilfen dafür auf 
allen Ebenen anzubieten.    
 
 
Have no doubt it is fear in the land. 
For what can men do when so many have grown lawless? 
Who can enjoy the lovely land, who can enjoy seventy years, 
and the sun that pours down on the earth, when there is fear in the heart? 
Who can walk quietly in the shadow of the jacarandas, when their beauty is grown 
in danger? Who can lie peacefully abed, while the darkness holds some secret? 
What lovers can lie sweetly under the stars, when the menace grows with the 
measure of their seclusion? There are voices crying what must be done, a hundred, 
a thousand voices. But what do they help if one seeks counsel, for one cries this, and 
one cries that, and another cries something that is neither this nor that. 
(Alan Paton, Cry The Beloved Country, 1949) 
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Creating a Culture of Violence 
The decade of the 1980s was one of the most violent periods in South African 
history. This period was characterised by the extensive use of force by the 
South African state and those opposing. This violence was typified by ar-
bitrary arrests, detention without trial, civil unrest, acts of sabotage, harass-
ment, torture, “disappearances” and the murder of political opponents and ri-
vals (Cock, 1990). Most of violence during the 1980s was orchestrated by the 
state and was targeted at victims both inside and outside the borders of South 
Africa. Many of the victims were very young and generally the families and 
relatives of these activists also suffered varying degrees of harassment and 
direct physical harm. This type of political violence has received enormous 
coverage in the media and in recent exposures by the Truth and Reconciliati-
on Commission (TRC) and could be termed vertical violence, i.e. violence 
perpetrated by the state against its citizens.  
There was also violence between rival political and social groupings, as 
well as armed resistance by the liberation forces. As a result, South African 
society was placed under continual stress of potential violence, either through 
acts of sabotage as the liberation movement resisted state control, or, as was 
more often the case, through living in dangerous, tumultuous and tightly po-
liced townships. By the 1990s, the term “culture of violence” was frequently 
used to describe the conflict that enveloped South African society (cf. (Vo-
gelman & Simpson, 1990). The pervasive nature of this violence seeped into 
all parts of public life, undermining the moral, interpersonal and social fabric 
of society.  
Paradoxically, however, it was the years directly after February 1990 
(when it was announced that the ANC was to be unbanned and Nelson 
Mandela released) that the violence reached its peak. The early period of 
transition to democracy in South Africa (1990-1994) was marked by 
unprecedented inter- and intra-community violence that largely played itself 
out, with the assistance of covert state operatives and funding, in the form of 
armed conflict between supporters of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).  
The violence during the 1990s stemmed directly from the intensification 
of the civil war in KwaZulu/Natal that rapidly spread to the other provinces 
(TRC Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 7, 8). Simpson and Rauch (1991) ar-
gue that the negotiations in the early 1990s facilitated a process of de-
regulating the overly repressive forms of social control that had characterised 
the apartheid state. The effects of the violence, which had been legitimised by 
all political groupings in the decades prior to the 1990s, lingered in a context 
in which the mechanisms for social control (e.g. the state security forces) en-
joyed even less legitimacy than before. In the context of the negotiated sett-
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lement, the repressive forms of control used by the apartheid government we-
re rendered ineffective, yet no viable alternative was generated by the hapha-
zard and slow process of negotiated transition. This created the space for po-
litical parties (such as the IFP) to freely use violence to build their local and 
national support bases. At precisely the point when the society was moving 
toward democracy, political and criminal violence escalated. This was crea-
ted largely by a vacuum in state authority and heightened competition bet-
ween political parties. Paradoxically this was the direct result of the processes 
of negotiated constitution-making that were essential to ensuring democracy.  
In the mid-1970s, political violence killed on average 44 persons a 
month. By the mid-1980s, this figure had risen to 86, and by the early 1990s 
it was 250 (SAIIR, 1993). The nature of violence in the early 1990s also 
changed, from vertical (i.e. the state against its citizens and the citizens a-
gainst the state) to horizontal (i.e. fellow citizens against one another). In the 
1970s and 1980s the police were responsible for most deaths. By the 1990s 
intra-community and intra-organisational conflict in the townships and rural 
areas (some covertly sponsored by the state and its agents) accounted for the 
greatest number of fatalities. Over the period of the negotiations from Febru-
ary 1990 to April 1994, as South Africa was supposedly normalising, 14,807 
people were killed, according to the South African Institute of Race Relati-
ons. This is in stark comparison to the previous five years, when the Institute 
reported 5,387 deaths from political violence. 
It should be noted that the divisions between what is labelled as ‘political’ vio-
lence and what is termed ‘criminal’ violence in South Africa has always been 
blurred. This accounts for some discrepancies between different agencies’ sta-
tistics on fatalities. In addition, relativising (and approximating) the number of 
fatalities should be used cautiously. Statistics cheapen the lives of each indivi-
dual killed and also obscure other forms of repression. Looking at the number 
of deaths that took place in 1980s alone does not tell the whole story. For e-
xample, between 1984 and 1986 the South African police shot dead 300 
children, wounded 1,000, detained 11,000 without trial, arrested 18,000 on 
charges relating to political protest and held a further 173,000 in police cells 
awaiting trial (CIIR, 1996). 
Since the first democratic election in April 1994 reports of political violence 
have decreased although not disappeared. In 1997, the Human Rights 
Committee reported that more than 300 people in Kwazulu-Natal and 151 
people in the rural Eastern Cape had been killed in political violence. 
The South African Institute for Race Relations Reported that 470 people died 
in political feuds in 1997. 
Between 1 January 1998 and 31 July 1998 a further 218 people had lost their 
lives due to political conflict (SAIRR, 1998) suggesting a slight increase in 
political violence with the advent of the second democratic election. 
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Although alarming, this is significantly lower and more manageable than it 
had been in the years immediately preceding the first democratic election. 
Despite sporadic clashes between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party, as 
well as recent violence between ANC members and the newly formed United 
Democratic Movement (UDM), it is unlikely that political violence will reach 
its pre-1994 levels. This is due to the current ANC-IFP détente (Chothia, 
1999) and because peace between the parties appears to be consolidating No-




Violence in Contemporary South Africa 
In South Africa today political violence is totally over-shadowed by the high 
levels of violent crime the country is experiencing. Recent trends show inc-
reased levels of crime from 1990 to the present.  
It should be noted that there are variances in incidence among different crimes 
and some have, in fact, been declining since 1990 and specifically after 1994. 
For example, murder rates, although still high, have been declining since 1994. 
The murder rate in South Africa has been steadily dropping since 1994. It was 
approximately 67, 65, 61 per 100,000 in 1994, 1995,1996 respectively. 
Concerns about ongoing political violence have been deflected and de-
prioritised. Comparatively speaking, the incidence of violence in South Afri-
ca is extremely high. In 1997, the homicide rate for South Africa was estima-
ted at about 57 per 100,000 inhabitants. This is compared to approximately 9 
per 100,000 in the United States and 1 per 100,000 in the United Kingdom. 
In Columbia, when the Medellin drug cartel was operating in the city of Me-
dellin in 1993, the homicide rate was an alarming 450 murders per 100,000 
(Roelefse-Campbell & Campbell, 1996a). Countries such as Brazil, which 
have more comparable histories to South Africa, show similar yet less drama-
tic trends in violent crime (Roelefse-Campbell & Campbell, 1996b). Brazil 
witnesses on average 39,000 murders a year, compared to the approximate 
25,000 in South Africa, a country with about one third of the population.  
Furthermore, the experience of being violently victimised in South Afri-
ca has almost become a statistically normal feature of everyday life in the 
many urban and rural settings in South Africa. Statistics released in January 
1999 by the Minister of Safety and Security showed that incidents of car hija-
cking, armed robbery, vehicle theft and burglary were all higher than in 1997 
(Cawthra & Kraak, 1999). New statistics show that 188 out of every 100,000 
South Africans were victims of armed robbery in 1998 while the figure for 
car hijackings was 33 (Cawthra & Kraak, 1999). The report, however, also 
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shows that some serious crimes such as murder, rape and bank robberies have 
declined from the previous years. 
Despite declines in the incidence of rape the situation remains grave. In 1997, 
52,160 rapes were reported to the South African Police Service (South African 
Police Services, Quarterly Report, 1/98). These statistics, however, are likely to 
underestimate the exact incidence of rape. The National Institute for Crime Pre-
vention and Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO 1993) estimates that only 1 in 
20 rapes are ever reported to the police. NICRO, therefore, speculates that a 
rape occurs in South Africa every 83 seconds. If this estimate is accurate, then 
at least one million women were raped in 1997. 
Although these statistics can be useful in making broad comparisons, the fi-
gures need to be understood in context. In South Africa, there are flashpoints 
of violence and the statistics generally indicate national averages (which are 
often disputed and are notoriously unreliable at times). In reality the probabi-
lity of being murdered in certain areas (for example, wealthy suburbs) re-
mains significantly lower than in other areas. The statistics may produce a 
high total, but pockets of relative safety still exist when compared to other 
dangerous areas that inflate the national means. High national statistics often 
erroneously lead to perceptions that violent crime is uniform and pervasive 
across all communities when this is not the case. 
Recent police statistics support the view that violent crime is by no 
means uniform across the country. For example, homicide rates in South 
Africa are highest in the rural areas and not in the urban centres as is often 
presumed. The mainly rural provinces of the Free State, Kwazulu-Natal and 
Mpumalanga are the murder and hijacking capitals of South Africa according 
to the report released by the Minister of Safety and Security in January 1999. 
The more rural provinces and less economically developed areas such as the 
Northern Cape also show the highest incidence of reported rape (CIMC, 
1997). Ironically, these are the areas with the most limited psycho-social sup-
port services for woman and children.  
Race also remains a primary predictor of violence in South Africa. There 
is a popular perception (largely held by white South Africans) that the 
wealthy are more affected by crime than the poor. This is at best only partly 
true. The rich are twice as likely to be victimised (usually predatory property 
crimes) than the poor, but the poverty-stricken are nearly 80 times more like-
ly to die or get hurt by crime than the well-off (Steinberg, 1999). Furthermo-
re, the annual incidence of violence experienced by African women is more 
than ten times that of their white counterparts (Trauma Review, 1996). These 
figures are in line with the increasing international evidence that poor people 
bear most of the brunt of violence in society (cf. Mercy, Rosenberg, Powell, 
Broome & Roper, 1993; Louw & Shaw, undated; HSRC survey cited in 
Louw & Shaw, undated). 
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Social inequality and enormous deprivation caused by the apartheid system 
are at the root of most violence in South Africa. But violent crime in South 
African society as a phenomenon has other multiple causal factors that extend 
beyond deprivation. Some of these include, to mention a few, a patriarchal 
society where women and children are devalued and vulnerable; the historical 
development of a culture of violence where violence was seen by all signifi-
cant political parties as a legitimate means to achieve their goals; the deregu-
lation of state control during the negotiations period; an ineffective criminal 
justice system and the perception that there will be no serious consequences 
for criminal activity; and the opening of South African borders to criminal 
syndicates and operations since the shift to democracy has also had some im-
pact on rising levels of crime (cf. Hamber, 1998a; NCPS, 1996; Simpson, 




The Continuing Cycles of Violence 
It is undoubtable that the current levels of violent crime and its multiple ma-
nifestations have been built on the legacy of the civil conflict of the past. The 
extensive nature of politicisation in South Africa has ensured that a “culture 
of violence” has bled into the social and civic arena of society (Simpson & 
Rauch, 1991). The structural violence effected by the state through inequali-
ties of resource and life chances in the past, coupled with repression, politici-
sed all forms of social existence (e.g. housing, education, jobs, wages, the de-
livery of services, etc.). The result is that the socially sanctioned use of vio-
lence to solve problems has saturated South African life (Simpson & Rauch, 
1991). This manifested itself most dramatically in the 1990-1994 period prior 
to the first democratic election and is continuing to play itself out in the post-
apartheid era.  
The perpetuation of the past and its dangerous impact on the present in 
South Africa is eloquently captured by Cawthra and Kraak (1999, 36) when 
they write: 
"the decades in which the police enforced apartheid have engendered a 
lingering mistrust of the rule of law and authorities. But crime is also 
intrinsically linked to poverty, unemployment, socio-economic inequali-
ties and gender inequality. The coalescence of these indices with the bru-
talisation that many experienced during the anti-apartheid struggle, has 
given crime in South Africa its particularly violent edge". 
Morris (1987) asserts that victims of criminal violence, if untreated, are at 
risk of perpetrating acts of retributive violence, or for displacing their aggres-
sion within the familial context. Some victims of violence in South Africa 
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have begun committing violent acts themselves - these actions are often asso-
ciated with vigilantism and self-administered “justice”. Increasing reports of 
this type of community and individual action against suspected criminals has 
been reported (Weekly Mail, 1997). A nation-wide survey by Market Re-
search Africa in 1997 indicated considerable support for vigilantism among 
black South Africans; one fifth of black respondents believe that it was 'so-
metimes right for a vigilante group to physically hurt a suspected criminal' 
(Schönteich, 1999). It is likely that these results would not differ fundamen-
tally in the white community. 
Summary justice carried out by community members is a frequently pre-
ferred alternative to the criminal justice system. It appears, at least on the sur-
face, to be quicker and a more direct method of dealing with crime. The ma-
jority of South Africans view the criminal justice system with suspicion and 
scepticism. This is not surprising considering that one in seven murders, one 
in 13 reported rapes, one in 34 armed robberies, one in 50 car thefts and one 
in 55 car hijackings results in a conviction (Cawthra & Kraak, 1999; Stein-
berg, 1999). Forty-one percent of South Africans would either "never" or 
"hardly ever" trust the police to investigate a crime or catch criminals (Reali-
ty Check, 1999). 
However, mistrust of the police service hardly equates with uncensored 
vigilantism. Vigilantism is seriously undermining South Africa's embryonic 
human rights culture. Unregulated "people's justice" leads to abuses and the 
transgression of human rights (Cawthra & Kraak, 1999). At present vigilan-
tism represents one of the most fundamental challenges to the human rights 
culture in South Africa (Pigou, Valji & Greenstein, 1998). 
Within the wealthier areas in South Africa "vigilantism" is being carried 
out in another form. The lack of faith in the criminal justice system by many 
wealthy South Africans has lead to increasing numbers of citizens turning to 
private security companies for their policing needs. It is estimated that the 
private security industry in South Africa has grown from R 141 million in 
1978 to R 8 billion currently (Schönteich, 1999; R 10 is the equivalent of a-
bout one pound sterling). There at least twice as many security guards as po-
liceman in the country (NIM, 1997). Many of these guards are poorly trained 
and armed, and the security industry is poorly regulated. Schönteich (1999) 
links the phenomenon of private security and vigilantism. He writes: 
Most people cannot afford the services of a private security company. 
Vigilantism is often the poor man's version of private security, and the poor 
are hit hardest by crime. Out of desperation they seek to protect themselves, 
or they seek to protection in numbers through the organisation of groups 
which often engage in, or encourage, vigilante action (p. 18). 
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The legacy of a "culture of violence" also still permeates the police ser-
vices. Gross human rights violations persist in the police service despite the 
end of apartheid. In the months April 1997 to September 1998 it was reported 
by the Independent Complaints Directorate that 1,081 people died in police 
custody, or as a result of police action. (The Independent Complaints Directo-
rate is a statutory body that was set up in April 1996 to investigate complaints 
against the police.) This may point to ongoing levels of impunity within the 
police services and insufficient checks and balances in terms of police opera-
tions despite a formal democratic disposition. The torture of criminal suspects 
by the police is continuing. The Independent Complaints Directorate received 
73 complaints about police torture over the 18 month period of April 1997 to 
September 1998, a figure which is suspected to hopelessly under-represent 
the abuses that are taking place. 
It is interesting to note that the torture of criminal suspects has always been a 
phenomenon in the South African police service. It was a practice that was ta-
king place along side the torture of political suspects during the apartheid era. 
A report released in 1995 (IBI, NIM & Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence 
and Torture, 1995) highlighted 350 cases of police torture of criminal suspects 
between 1990 and 1995. It argues that, although not well documented, the tor-
ture of criminal suspects may well have been higher than the torture of political 
dissidents under the apartheid regime. 
South Africa, like countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile (cf. Hamber, 
1997; Pinheiro, 1994; Pinheiro, 1996), seems to be suffering from ongoing 
authoritarianism and resultant human rights violations by the police. This is 
happening despite the instatement of democratic governance and the investi-
gations carried out by the TRC into the past activities of the police. There is 
little evidence, at least at this stage, that the TRC's exposure of police atroci-
ties committed in the past are generalising into the current work of the police 
service. If anything, the high rates of crime in South Africa are paradoxically 
giving the police a freer hand to commit violations. The public is increasingly 
advocating tougher anti-crime measures due to their fear of rampant crime. A 
recent survey revealed that 70% of South African respondents either agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement that "criminals have too many rights" 
(Reality Check, 1999). In addition, 31% of all South Africans feel the police 
have the right to use force to extract information from criminal suspects (Pi-
gou, Valji & Greenstein, 1998).  
Despite the TRC's efforts in its final report to highlight ongoing police 
abuses (see TRC Final Report, Volume 5, Chapter 8, 68), it appears that in 
the minds of the general public the atrocities committed by the police under 
the apartheid system are considered fundamentally different to those current-
ly taking place. The TRC has unwittingly exacerbated the situation by trying 
to artificially delineate between political and criminal violence - a distinction, 
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which in most cases is impossible. It remains questionable to what degree the 
TRC has adequately exposed, understood and consequently impacted upon 
the current culture of the police service. 
The TRC has been relatively successful at uncovering the truth about 
atrocities of the past through its trade of truth for justice. 
Some would argue that the TRC has only uncovered a small section of the 
'truth' in South Africa. In parts of the country very little new information has 
emerged. For example, in the Vaal region outside Johannesburg, a site of ex-
tensive political violence including a number of massacres, only three South 
African policeman have applied for amnesty. 
During the negotiations that ensured South Africa's first democratic election the 
ANC did not have sufficient power to demand prosecutions of former human 
rights abusers (and in reality the criminal justice system in South Africa pro-
bably did not have the resources or efficiency to prosecute large numbers of in-
dividuals anyway). However, it had sufficient power to prevent the NP from 
granting itself blanket amnesty. The balance of power tipped slightly in favour 
of the ANC gave birth to a criterion-driven amnesty process. Amnesty would 
be granted only on condition that the crime was political in nature and that the 
individual fully disclosed all of the details of the act for which amnesty was 
sought. In essence, truth was traded for formal justice. The function of deciding 
on amnesties fell on the TRC. 
However, the exact impact of amnesty (with or without the truth being forced 
from the perpetrators) on ongoing levels of impunity is not yet fully un-
derstood. Despite the full disclosure of the atrocities of the perpetrators 
through the TRC, and the TRC highlighting them in its final report, perpetra-
tors have largely not been punished for gross violations of human rights. 
Contrary to Article 2.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 
states that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a 
justification for torture, several torturers from both the apartheid state and the 
liberation forces, have been granted amnesty for their actions which were 
considered "political". As a result, a subtle, but stubbornly residual air of im-
punity still lingers in the South Africa society and in its police service.  
This has happened within a context of high crime rates and where the 
criminal justice policies have become increasingly politicised. The politicisa-
tion of crime has obscured the real challenges facing crime prevention and 
the development of a sustainable human rights culture. All parties contesting 
the second democratic election in June 1999 used the issue of crime as a ma-
jor political rallying point. Most of their campaigns exploited the fears of the 
population that crime is spiralling out of control. This fed the already rampant 
fear that permeates much of the current South African mindset. Crime rates 
are genuinely high, but the general population's fear of victimisation is on the 
whole out of proportion to the real threat. This ongoing fear and anxiety, of-
ten spurred on by politicians who want to portray the country as being mis-
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managed by the current government, further traumatises the already vulne-
rable population. The impact of the psychology of fear is captured by Hamber 
and Lewis (1998) when they write: 
"It is this situation, understandable and realistic as it is on some levels, 
that makes us see violence in our society as spinning increasingly out of 
control, even when it is not. In the long run, this fuels a sense of 
helplessness in the society - in turn, psychologically empowering the cri-
minals and preventing us from finding solutions" (Crime's worst horror is 
all in the mind, Sunday Times, 1 March 1998).  
The exact and pervasive nature of the fear and anxiety that has been created 
by crime in the post-apartheid South Africa remains an under-researched a-
rea. However, it is likely that the current levels of fear in the society is, at le-
ast in part, a symptom of the traumatisation that took place during the 
struggle to overthrow and defend the apartheid state. Fear impacts on the po-
pulation increasingly uncritically accepting mono-causal explanations for 
crime. Political rhetoric such as "Hang Murders and Rapists" (New National 
Party slogan) and the Democratic Party's haunting election radio adverts that 
list endless acontextual statistics about individuals chances of being victimi-
sed ride on a wave of fear. Along with the years of apartheid, which under-
mined all South Africans' basic understanding of human rights and legitimi-
sed the use of violence across the board, this political rhetoric feeds into 
simplistic understandings of the causes of violence and appropriate solutions. 
For example, 92% of Indians, 91% of whites, 85% of so-called coloureds and 
68% of Africans in South Africa favour the reintroduction of the death penal-
ty (Reality Check, 1999). Both black and white South Africans naively belie-
ve that reintroducing the death penalty will seriously curb violent crime.  
South Africa's fragile human rights culture is being incapacitated. All 
the major political parties have largely retreated from their human rights 
principles under the weight of popular mono-causal explanations for crime. 
The view that violence is differentially spread and that localised prevention 
strategies are the best option to ameliorate some types of crime is becoming 
increasingly lost in South Africa.  
The ongoing fear in the society not only disempowers the population, 
but when action is taken it seems to take the form of more drastic and extre-
me interventions. This is typified by "people's justice" and ongoing police 
abuses which are, in part, fuelled by feelings of fear. Fear (and the ongoing 
legacy of the traumas of the past) drive individuals to feel that it is necessary 
to go to extremes to curb crime. Clearly, if ignored, certain victims of past 
violence are at risk of becoming the perpetrators of retributive violence or 
displaced social and domestic violence (NCPS, 1996; Simpson, 1996).  
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A recent survey in South Africa found that a one in five men and one in ten 
woman felt that it was sometimes necessary to hit a woman partner (Pigou, 
Valji & Greenstein, 1998). 
The recent trends in increased violence through vigilantism and the ongoing 
use of political revenge and retribution in Kwazulu-Natal, bear testimony to 
this thesis.  
The National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) recognises this danger, 
and argues that in the case of violent crime, victim empowerment and effecti-
ve support can break the cycle of violence and therefore can be viewed as 
preventative. Trauma counselling and a range of other interventions (e.g. vic-
tim-care strategies such as the establishment of crisis centres) with traumati-
sed individuals, would be effective in alleviating and preventing the conse-
quences and effects of violent victimisation. The TRC Final Report also re-
cognises the need for appropriate models for trauma counselling in the South 




Breaking the Cycles of the Past 
In South Africa the legacy of the past and how it destructively plays itself out 
in the present needs to be fully understood if current levels of violence are to 
be adequately addressed. This has happened through the TRC to some de-
gree, but the lessons from the past highlighted by the TRC show little eviden-
ce of generalising to the current context in South Africa. The double-bind 
when dealing with the aftermath of large-scale political violence is that 
acknowledgement, apology, recognition and even substantial material impro-
vement can never bring back the dead or be guaranteed to converge with, and 
ameliorate, all the levels of psychological pain suffered by a survivor (Ham-
ber, 1998b). Nor is rapid economic progress a panacea to deal with the long-
term effects of political violence. Unfortunately, the amount of distress, hurt, 
injustice and anger experienced by the survivor is immeasurable. Strategies to 
assist those who were victimised in the past need to continue. There is a gra-
ve danger that the plight of the survivors of past violence will be ignored now 
that the TRC is officially over. 
Furthermore, those politically victimised in the past remain at the hig-
hest risk of victimisation in the current context. The majority of survivors 
who appeared before the TRC were victimised not only because of their poli-
tical affiliation and activities, but because of their structural circumstances 
including their gender, poverty, race and general social marginalisation 
(Hamber & Kibble, 1999). The structural circumstances of most of these in-
dividuals remain largely unchanged and their social marginalisation remains 
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the primary risk factor for them being victims of violent crime in the current 
context. 
The voices of these survivors, who could now potentially be re-
victimised, will undoubtedly be heard for many years. On a purely psycholo-
gical level, for a survivor to react in an overly forgiving way toward perpetra-
tors, or to simply let bygones be bygones, is highly improbable in the short-
term with or without a truth commission (Hamber, 1998c). The TRC has been 
a catalyst for successful resolution of this kind in some cases. However, when 
the TRC is complete, and reparations are granted, psychologically most sur-
vivors will not be ready to put the past behind them at that specific point. 
Furthermore, if they are re-victimised, even if this is re-victimisation is not 
political in nature and is purely criminal, their chances of reconciling them-
selves with the violence of the past remain slim. This will have a long-term 
impact on the political project of reconciliation that was pursued by the TRC. 
Ongoing space has to be provided for survivors to express their feelings 
of sadness and rage as they struggle to come to terms with the psychological 
and emotional impact of their past loss and that much in their current structu-
ral situation remains unchanged. Survivors of apartheid violence cannot be 
pushed down the road of forgiveness and amnesia if they are not ready purely 
because it is nationally expedient. These spaces can take the form of private 
spaces (e.g. counselling, traditional mechanisms for story-telling and sharing, 
etc.) and the ongoing use of public space (e.g. media, exhibitions, etc.). At 
the same time accurate information is needed if violence is to be restricted. 
Reliable epidemiological data is desperately needed in South Africa. Accura-
te data collection could identify risk factors for violence (e.g. substance abu-
se, fire-arms, etc.) and violence “hot-spots”, and in so doing contribute to tar-
geted and directed intervention strategies.  
The proliferation of firearms, particularly small arms, is one of the major fac-
tors in the high incidents of violence in South Africa. It is estimated that there 
are 11 to 13 million firearms in South Africa, 4 million are legally owned, 1 to 
4 million illegally held and about 5 million belong to the Defence Force and 
Police Service (NCPS, 1996). 11,190 people were killed with firearms in 1997 
(Gun Free South Africa Statistics Sheet, 7 April 1999). 
The needs of survivors of political violence also cannot be divorced from the 
socio-economic context. Economic disparity in South Africa remains stark. 
The standard of living of average black South Africans is comparable to the 
124th most wealthy nation in the world (after Congo), whereas for the avera-
ge white South African it is comparable to the 24th (after Spain; United Nati-
ons Development Programme figures cited in Villa-Vicencio 1998). 
If inequality persists, the tide of unmet expectations and the rise of a 
perceived new black elite may lead the general populace to complain (and 
protest) about structural conditions.  
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Despite the growth in the black middle class in South Africa the plight of the 
very poor is not improving. Over 4 million blacks now compromise more than 
half of the top-income earners in the country, but there has been a decline in 
wealth among the 25 million people - about 60% of the total - who are poor 
(Hawthorne, 1999). 
In the worst case scenario survivors who appeared before the TRC may even 
start to feel that they were the pawns in the process of reconciliation and con-
solidation of new forms of power. They could then see the TRC as a process 
that ignored their poverty, but used their voices to ensure greater levels of po-
litical co-existence between the elites in the name of reconciliation. 
A further concern is that in societies going through transition it is often 
the large scale political conflict and criminal violence, and particular brutal 
acts of violence, that tend to receive attention at the expense of the more hid-
den costs of violence. The micro-effects of violence that ripple through com-
munities generally go unnoticed. For example, violent intra-community 
conflict can cause the destruction of the social fabric and culture of commu-
nities, and disrupt schooling, resulting in incremental disadvantage over time.  
Critically the violence of the 1990-1994 period has not been dealt with 
to the same extent as the violence in the other periods. Relatively speaking 
the horizontal violence that took place within communities (which accounted 
for the most fatalities) has been sorely neglected despite all South Africa's at-
tempts at reconciliation. The TRC admits to have "failed to make significant 
breakthroughs in relation to violence in the 1990s" (Volume 5, Chapter 6, 
54). It is further notes:  
"While Commission figures for reported violations in the earlier part of 
its mandate period are under-represented in part because of the passage 
of time, they are under-reported in this later period because the abuses 
are still fresh in people’s memories and closely linked into current distri-
bution of power incidents" (TRC Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 7, 7).  
Of 9,043 statements received on killings, over half of these (5,695) occurred 
during the 1990 to 1994 period. These figures give an indication of violations 
recorded by the Commission during the negotiations process (TRC Final Re-
port, Volume 2, Chapter 7, 7). 
It is vitally important that it is acknowledged that the apartheid past has left a 
legacy of violence and mistrust within communities themselves and not mere-
ly between the state and its citizens. Many communities in South Africa re-
main internally conflicted and divided. These divisions have only been parti-
ally dealt with by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (cf. van der 
Merwe, 1998). It is within communities, and at the local level, where future 
conflict is likely to manifest itself. This will occur when new power struggles 
emerge, as leaders vie for the support of the marginalised sections of the po-
pulation. In this context, disaffected individuals, and those who feel their 
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rights to justice under the amnesty laws were sacrificed for minimal return in 
the past, and whose structural conditions remain unchanged, who will beco-
me the first recruits of political entrepreneurs who will exploit past resent-
ments.  
All of South African society has been traumatised to some degree. This 
requires the type of social and political rehabilitation policy the TRC has 
partly championed. The need for ongoing individual medical and psychologi-
cal support services to thousands of victims of past and current levels of vio-
lence remains a national priority. In addition, where societal functioning and 
cohesion has been damaged, or where there is abject poverty, repairing com-
munity and cultural bonds and structures may be as important as psychologi-
cal assistance. 
The history of conflict in South Africa teaches us that, on the backbone 
of a fragile social fabric undermined by years of apartheid’s destruction, poli-
tical tensions often result in violence that spreads horizontally across com-
munities. The compromises between all parties that resulted in peace in South 
Africa helped quell this type of violence before, but not before an excessive 
loss of life and the erosion of the social fabric. Today in South Africa the si-
tuation is very different. The legacy of the violence of the past lives on, but 
political consensus is no longer the key to a stable political environment. Ra-
ther what is needed is a mature government that is prepared to invest in the 
long term. Such a government would welcome critical evaluation of their a-
chievements, invest energy in genuine economic re-distribution and continue 
to forward an unequivocal human rights agenda. Stability in the long term re-
quires the government to stand by their human rights policies and not to 
retreat from them, despite the misplaced fears of the population that it is the 
new human rights-orientated dispensation that has resulted in a  rise in vio-
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